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Discourse Generation, Temporal Constraints, and
Defeasible Reasoning

Jon Oberlander and Alex Lascarides
Centre for Cognitive Science and Human Communication Research Centre
University of Edinburgh
Introduction
Given the causal and temporal relations between
events in a knowledge base, what are the ways they
can be described in text?
Elsewhere, we have argued that defeasible rea-
soning underlies the hearer's temporal interpreta-
tion of text. Here, we argue, on the basis of the
kind of temporal information that remains implicit
in candidate utterances, that if the speaker is to
tailor text to the hearer, then defeasible reason-
ing must be integrated into the generation process.
We suggest two ways in which this can be done: a
version of Hobbs et al's [1988, 1990] Generation
as Abduction, and the Interactive Defaults Strat-
egy introduced by Joshi et al [1984, 1986]. As-
suming the Interactive Defaults strategy, the basic
goal is to determine how notions of temporal reli-
ability, precision and coherence can be used by a
nonmonotonic logic to constrain the space of possi-
ble utterances. We explore a defeasible reasoning
framework in which the interactions between the
relative knowledge bases of speakers and hearers
helps do this. Finally, we briey discuss an ob-
jection to the programme as outlined, considering
whether discourse structure has been marginalised.
To motivate the discussion, let us consider why
we might want to generate discourses with struc-
tures which lead to temporal complexities.
Getting Things Out of Order
Consider the following suggestion for generating
textual descriptions of causal-temporal structures.
Describe things in exactly the order in which they
happened. Make textual order match eventual or-
der, and little can go wrong; the hearer can safely
assume that all the texts they hear are narra-
tive. Under these circumstances, the problem of
choosing the adequate locations in utterance space
pretty much dissolves. We do not believe that this
suggestion will work, in general, and consider here
two arguments against it.

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Hovy's argument
Basically, the suggestion canvassed above fails to
emphasise the force of some eventualities over oth-
ers (cf. the nucleus-satellite distinction in rst).
A useful device for emphasis is the topic-comment
structure: we mention the important event rst,
and then the others, which ll out or give fur-
ther detail about that important event. These
`comments' on the `topic' may be eects, but they
could also be the cause of the topic. If the latter,
then textual order and temporal order mismatch;
the text is a causal explanation in such cases, and
having only narrative discourse structure available
would preclude its generation. Compare (1) and
(2), modied from Hovy [1990].
(1) First, Jim bumped Mike once and hurt him.
Then they fought. Eventually, Mike stabbed
him. As a result, Jim died.
(2) Jim died in a ght with Mike. After Jim
bumped Mike once, they fought, and eventu-
ally Mike stabbed him.
The textual order in (1) matches temporal order,
whereas in (2) there is mismatch. And yet (2) is
much better than (1). This is because the `impor-
tant' event is Jim's death. Everything mentioned
in (1) leads up to this. But because the events
are mentioned in their temporal order, the text
obscures the fact that all the events led to Jim's
death, even though syntactic markers like and then
and as a result are used.
The causal groupings are clearer in (2) because
it's clear during incremental processing that the
text following the mention of Jim's death is a de-
scription of how it came about. This is so even
though no syntactic markers indicate this causal
structure. By contrast, in (1) the reader realises
what's going on only at the last sentence. The
discourse structure is therefore unclear until the
whole text is heard, for the narrative requires a
common topic which is only stated at the end.
States interact with causal information
In Lascarides and Oberlander [1991], we consid-
ered in detail the following pair of examples:
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch
dark.
(4) Max switched o the light. The room was pitch
dark.
Now, no-one would want to say that (3) involved
a room becoming pitch dark immediately after a
door was opened. Rather, most accounts (such as
those based in or around drt, such as Hinrichs
[1986]) will take the state of darkness to overlap
the event of door-opening. That's how one might
say states are dealt with in a narrative: events
move things along; states leave them where they
are. But if we have a piece of causal information
to hand, things are rather dierent. In (4), it seems
that the state doesn't overlap the previously men-
tioned event. If one wishes to preserve the assump-
tion about the role of states in narrative, it would
have to be weakened to the constraint that states
either leave things where they are, or move them
along. This is not a very convincing move. An al-
ternative is to formalise the role of the additional
defeasible causal knowledge. In generation, such
knowledge will aect the space of adequate utter-
ances; if H lacks the defeasible causal knowledge
that switching o lights cause darkness, then (4)
won't be adequate for H , who will interpret (4) in
the same way as (3), contrary to S's intentions.
The important point for now is that even if we
describe things in the order in which they are as-
sumed to happen, this doesn't necessarily make the
candidate utterance a good one. If the speaker and
the hearer possess diering world knowledge, there
may be problems in retrieving the correct causal-
temporal structure.
Two Methods of Generating with
Defeasible Knowledge
Generation by Defeasible Reasoning
There is a very general way in which we might view
interpretation and generation in terms of defeasible
reasoning. Consider the process of discourse inter-
pretation as one of kb extension. The kb contains
an utterance-interpretation, and a set of knowledge
resources; the latter may include general knowl-
edge of the world, knowledge of linguistic facts,
knowledge about the discourse so far, and about
the speaker's knowledge state. We then try to ex-
tend the kb so as to include the discourse interpre-
tation. Consider now the process of generation; it
too can be can be thought of as kb extension. This
time, the kb contains a temporal-causal structure,
and a set of knowledge resources, perhaps identi-
cal to that used in interpretation. We now try to
extend the kb so as to include a realization of the
structure's semantic features (with predicates, ar-
guments, connectives, orderings). This view might
be described as generation by defeasible reasoning .
Modulo more minor dierences, these notions
are close to the ideas of interpretation as abduc-
tion (Hobbs et al [1988]) and generation as ab-
duction (Hobbs et al [1990:26{28]), where we take
abduction, for instance, to be a process returning
a temporal-causal structure which can explain the
utterance in context. Correspondences between
a defeasible deduction approach and an abduc-
tive approach have been established by Konolige
[1991]; he shows that the two are nearly equiva-
lent, the consistency-based approach being slightly
more powerful [1991:15{16], once closure axioms
are added to the background theory.
Interactive defaults
We turn now to another, perhaps less powerful,
method of applying defeasible reasoning: the Inter-
active Defaults (id) strategy introduced by Joshi,
Webber and Weischedel [1984, 1986]. Rather than
considering the defeasible process as applying di-
rectly to the kb's causal network, we instead con-
sider its role as constraining or debugging can-
didate linearised utterances, generated by some
other process; here we will remain relatively neu-
tral on the nature of that originating process.
A speaker S and a hearer H interact through
a dialogue; a writer S and a reader H interact
through a text. Joshi et al argue that it is in-
evitable that both S and H infer more form ut-
terances than is explicitly contained within them.
Taking Grice's [1975] Maxim of Quality seriously,
they argue that since both S and H know this is
going to happen, it is incumbent upon S to take
into account the implicatures H is likely to make
on the basis of a candidate utterance. If S de-
tects that something S believes to be false will be
among H 's implicatures, S must block that infer-
ence somehow. The basic way to block it is for S
to use a dierent utterance; one which S does not
believe will mislead H .
In terms of defeasible reasoning, the point is
that S must use it to calculate the consequences of
the candidate utterance; if the process allows the
derivation of something S believes to be false, the
utterance should not be used in its current form.
Joshi et al illustrate with the following example;
given the kb in (5), and the question in (6), they
want the process to show why the answer in (7b)
is preferred to that in (7a):
(5) Sam is an associate professor; most associate
professors are tenured; Sam is not tenured.
(6) Is Sam an associate professor?
(7) a. Yes.
b. Yes, but he is not tenured.
We wish to assume this interactive defaults strat-
egy (id), and consider in detail the defeasible rea-
soning about causal-temporal structures that S
and H are assumed by S to indulge in; and to con-
sider which candidate utterances are eliminated on
this basis.
ID with temporal constraints
The basic model in which we embed id as-
sumes that candidate discourses possess hierarchi-
cal structure, with units linked by discourse re-
lations modelled after those proposed by Hobbs
[1985]. Lascarides and Asher [1991] use Narration,
Explanation, Background, Result and Elaboration.
These structures have temporal implications, cal-
culable via the nonmonotonic logic mash proposed
by Asher and Morreau [1991]. For instance:
 Narration
Clauses  and  that are discourse-related are
normally such that Narration(; ) holds.
 Axiom for Narration
If Narration(; ) holds, and  and  describe
the events e
1
and e
2
respectively, then e
1
occurs
before e
2
.
Conicts where one rule has a more specic an-
tecedent than the other are resolved in favour
of the more specic (this pattern of inference is
known as the Penguin Principle). id is exploited
within this logical framework to detect violations
of constraints on these temporal implications; can-
didates violating the temporal constraints will be
rejected (or debugged). We would urge that de-
feasible reasoning is a useful notion in generation
only if an underlying notion of nonmonotonic logi-
cal consequence is dened. Otherwise, as argued in
Lascarides and Oberlander [1991], the choice made
among conicting knowledge sources appears arbi-
trary. mash provides a good starting point.
Following Bach [1986], we take `eventualities' to
cover both events and states. We dene temporal
coherence, temporal reliability and temporal preci-
sion in terms of a set C of relations between even-
tualities. This set intuitively describes when two
eventualities are connected. The relations in C
are: causation, the part/whole relation,
1
tempo-
ral overlap, and the immediately precedes relation
(where `e
1
immediately precedes e
2
' means that e
1
and e
2
stand in a causal or part/whole relation
that is compatible with e
1
temporally preceding
e
2
).
2
The denitions are as follows:
 Temporal Coherence
A text is temporally coherent if the reader can
infer that at least one of the relations in C holds
between the eventualities described in the sen-
tences.
 Temporal Reliability
A text is temporally reliable if one of the relations
in C which the reader infers to hold does in fact
hold between the eventualities described in the
sentences.
 Temporal Precision
A text is temporally precise if whenever the
reader infers that one of a proper subset of the
relations in C holds between the eventualities de-
scribed in the sentences, then she is also able to
infer which.
A text is temporally incoherent if the natural in-
terpretation of the text is such that there are no
1
We think of `e
1
is part of e
2
' in terms of Moens and
Steedman's [1988] event terminology, as `e
1
is part of the
preparatory phase or consequent phase of e
2
'.
2
We assume that an event e
1
precedes an event e
2
if
e
1
's culmination occurs before e
2
's. So there are part/whole
relations between e
1
and e
2
that are compatible with e
1
temporally preceding e
2
.
inferrable relations between the events. A text is
temporally misleading, or as we shall say, unre-
liable if the natural interpretation of the text is
such that the inferred relations between the events
dier from their actual relations in the world. In
addition, a text is temporally imprecise, or as we
shall say, ambiguous , if the natural interpretation
of the text is such that the reader knows that one
of a proper subset of relations in C holds between
the eventualities, but the reader can't infer which
of this proper subset holds.
It follows from the above denitions that a text
can be coherent but unreliable. On the other hand,
there may be no question about reliability simply
because we cannot establish a temporal or causal
relation between the two eventualities.
Applying the ID strategy
Before applying id with temporal constraints, we
wish to mention the generation policies with which
id is compatible, and the possible relations be-
tween the knowledge of speaker S and that which
speaker S has about hearer H 's knowledge state.
ID and generation policies
id is quite neutral about generation policy, and
applies to two main approaches to the generation
of an appropriate utterance. Do we generate all
possible utterances, and then apply defeasible rea-
soning, or do we generate candidates one at a time,
and apply defeasible reasoning on each cycle? That
is: is id designed to constrain utterance space, or
debug candidate utterances? Joshi et al explicitly
adopt the latter view. In principle, their frame-
work, however, is more general. Although the idea
of debugging is intuitive, we shall sometimes talk
in terms of constraining the space of utterances,
rather than of debugging specic utterances.
Relative KBs
Let B(S) be S's beliefs about the kb, lk and wk.
Let B
+
(H) be S's beliefs about what H believes
about the kb, lk and wk. And let B
 
(H) be
S's beliefs about what H doesn't know about the
kb, lk and wk (so B
+
(H) and B
 
(H) are mu-
tually exclusive). Problems concerning reliability
and precision arise when B(S) and B
+
(H) are dif-
ferent. They also arise when S's knowledge of
what H believes is partial (i.e. when for some p
used to generate an utterance, p 62 B
+
(H) and
p 62 B
 
(H)). Suppose that a wff is relevant to
generating a particular utterance about the kb.
Then there are several possible relations between
B(S), B
+
(H) and B
 
(H) that concern p:
 Case 1
S knows p and also knows that H does not:
p 2 B(S) and p 2 B
 
(H)
 Case 2
S knows p and isn't sure whether H does or not:
p 2 B(S) and p 62 B
+
(H) and p 62 B
 
(H)
 Case 3
H potentially knows more about p than S does:
p 62 B(S) and p 62 B
+
(H) and p 62 B
 
(H)
 Case 4
S thinks H is mistaken in believing p:
p 62 B(S) and p 2 B
+
(H)
Of course, the case where p 2 B(S) and p 2
B
+
(H) is unproblematic, and so glossed over here.
We look at each of these cases in turn, consid-
ering the extent to which the relations of reliabil-
ity, coherence and precision help us constrain the
utterance space (or alternately, debug candidate
utterances).
Case 1: S knows more about p than H
We now examine the problems concerning reliabil-
ity that arise when p 2 B(S) and p 2 B
 
(H).
There are two possibilities: either p represents de-
feasible knowledge of the language or the world, or
p is some fact in the kb. We investigate these in
turn.
p is defeasible knowledge Let p be a defeasi-
ble law that represents knowledge that S has and
which S knowsH lacks. To illustrate, take the case
where p is the following causal preference concern-
ing falling and pushing (introduced and formally
represented in Lascarides and Oberlander [1991]):
 If the events e
1
of x falling and e
2
of y pushing
x are connected, then normally e
2
caused e
1
.
Consider the case where John's pushing Max
caused the latter to fall. Suppose S has a kb which
will allow her to generate the description in (8),
among others.
(8) Max fell. John pushed him.
Elsewhere, we have argued that this text is coher-
ent, precise and reliable for S because the causal
law (about the usual causal relation between push-
ings and fallings) is more specic than the linguis-
tic rule (Narration). But since H lacks the causal
law, (8) will trigger a dierent inference pattern
in H ; one in which Narration wins after all. S
must block this pattern by changing the utterance;
she has essentially two options. If clause order is
kept xed, then S could shift tense into the plu-
perfect as in (9); or else S can insert a clue word ,
such as because, into the surface form, to generate
(10):
(9) Max fell. John had pushed him.
(10) Max fell because John pushed him.
The success of the latter tactic requires S and H to
mutually know a new linguistic rule, more specic
than Narration, such as the following:
3
 Non-evidential `Because'
A text segment  because  (where  and  are
discourse-related clauses) is normally such that
the event described in  is caused by the event
described in .
On the other hand, if clause order is not taken to
be xed, then S can simply reorder the sentences
in (8):
(11) John pushed Max. Max fell.
So, when S believes H lacks the relevant causal
law, S can simply reorder, and let Narration do
the rest. However, recalling the above discus-
sion, in some cases a discourse structure that in-
vokes Explanation is better than one that invokes
Narration. So simply reordering events and let-
ting the rule for Narration achieve the correct in-
ferences won't work successfully in all cases.
Furthermore, recalling the discussion about
states and causation above, it becomes apparent
3
This is a pragmatic, rather than semantic rule; it's not
obvious that this is the best choice of representation.
that this tactic of always letting Narration do the
work will lead to problems with texts like (3) and
(4).
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch
dark.
(4) Max switched o the light. The room was pitch
dark.
The reason is that, in the absence of the causal law
which relates light switching to darkness, (4) will
be analysed exactly as (3), giving the wrong result.
A solution would be to replace the state expression
with an event expression:
(4
0
) Max switched o the light. The room went
pitch dark.
An obvious alternative is to introduce further clue
words, and appropriate linguistic rules for reason-
ing about them. This means exploiting linguis-
tic knowledge to overcome the gaps in H 's world
knowledge. This helps explain the observation that
texts which describe events in reverse to temporal
order, without marking the reverse, may be quite
rare. It's easy enough to interpret such texts, when
we have the appropriate wk. But if a considerate
speaker or writer has reason to believe that some or
all of her audience lacks that wk, then she will ei-
ther avoid such descriptive reversals, or mark them
with the type of clues we have discussed.
p is a fact in the kb We now turn to the case
where p is a fact about the kb which S knows
and which S knows H lacks. Suppose that p as-
serts a causal relation between two events that does
not represent an exception to any defeasible causal
preferences. Then S can simply state p by ex-
ploiting H 's available lk. Clue words may not
be needed. For example, if p is the fact that Max
stood up and then John greeted him, S can tell
H this by uttering (5); Narration will make (5)
reliable and precise for H .
(5) Max stood up. John greeted him.
Similarly, if p is the fact that Max opened the door,
and while this was going on the room was pitch
dark, then (3) is reliable and precise for H :
(3) Max opened the door. The room was pitch
dark.
But what if p asserts a causal relation between
two events that violates a defeasible causal prefer-
ence thatH has? Suppose p asserts that Max's fall
immediately preceded John's pushing him. And
suppose that S knows that H has the defeasible
causal law, but lacks p. Then neither (8) nor (11)
are reliable for H , indicating that S cannot gener-
ate an atomic text to assert p.
(8) Max fell. John pushed him.
(11) John pushed Max. He fell.
The obvious option is to move from (8) to (12);
another option is to recruit the pluperfect, as in
(13); note that (14) is not the solution, since so
can be read epistemically (evidentially).
(12) Max fell. And then John pushed him.
(13) John pushed Max. He had fallen.
(14) Max fell. So John pushed him.
The need to utter (12) rather than (8) explains why
it can be necessary to use and then, even though
the full-stop is always available and, by Narration,
has the default eect of temporal progression. So,
in general, one might wish to paraphrase Joshi et
al: if a relation can be defeasibly inferred to hold
between two eventualities, and S wants something
dierent, it is essential tomark the desired relation
with something stronger. Having a little causal
knowledge is sometimes worse than having none
at all.
Case 2: S knows p but isn't sure if H does
In general, S will have only partial knowledge
about H 's beliefs.
p is a defeasible causal preference Suppose
that S isn't sure whether or not H believes the
defeasible causal law relating falling and pushing.
Then there are at least two ways in which S's
model ofH 's knowledge can be expanded to a com-
plete statement of H 's knowledge. The rst, B
1
,
contains the causal law. The second, B
2
, does not.
If S assumes H 's knowledge corresponds to
B
1
, then H will nd a reliable interpretation for
(8).
(8) Max fell. John pushed him.
On the other hand, if S assumes that H 's knowl-
edge corresponds to B
2
, then H will interpret (8)
in an undesirable way, with the falling preceding
the pushing.
Under this model, S isn't sure how H will inter-
pret (8), because S doesn't know if H 's knowledge
corresponds to B
1
or B
2
. Hence the ambiguity
of (8) manifests itself to the generator S, if not
to the hearer H , because S doesn't have sucient
information about H to predict which of the two
alternative temporal structuresH will infer for (8).
This is slightly dierent to the previous case where
S actually knows H lacks the causal law, making
(8) unreliable.
To avoid uttering unreliable text, S will have to
utter something other than (8). Indeed, it may be
possible for S not to worry about the ambiguity of
(8) at all, if some `safe' strategy can be found that
would guide S's expansion of H 's knowledge in a
way that would ensure the generation of reliable
text for H . A plausible strategy for S's reasoning
about H would be the following: if S isn't sure
whether or not H knows p, then assume H doesn't
know p. On the face of it this seems plausible. But
just how safe is it?
We state it in terms of B
+
(H) and B
 
(H):
 If p 62 B
+
(H) and p 62 B
 
(H), assume p 2
B
 
(H) and generate-and-test under this as-
sumption.
But this won't work in general. If S wants to con-
vey a violation of the causal law p, but H actually
believes p, then the strategy will suggest the use of
(8), which will actually be unreliable for H .
By and large, S will have to consider several al-
ternative expansions of H 's knowledge. As a re-
sult, ambiguity of text will manifest itself to S in
certain cases, because of her partial knowledge of
H . This is perhaps somewhat surprising. Non-
monotonic reasoning is designed as a medium for
reasoning with partial knowledge. And yet here we
have shown S cannot maintain textual reliability
on the basis of a partial statement of H 's kb, even
if nonmonotonic inference is exploited.
p is a fact about the kb: Ambiguity Suppose
that S wants to convey the information that Max's
fall immediately preceded John pushing him, and
suppose S knows thatH knows the causal law, but
S doesn't know for sure if H knows already that
Max fell before John pushed him. Then, for similar
reasons as those mentioned earlier, S isn't sure if
(8) is reliable or not.
(8) Max fell. John pushed him.
To be sure that text is reliable in this case, S will
again have to exploit linguistic knowledge; for ex-
ample, by uttering (12) instead of (8).
(12) Max fell and then John pushed him.
These examples show that a little knowledge of H
is a dangerous thing.
Case 3: H as advisor, S as pupil
Suppose that for a certain proposition p, p 62 B(S),
p 62 B
+
(H) and p 62 B
 
(H). This corresponds to
H potentially knowing more about p than S, but
S not knowing what more. That's pretty much the
position of the tutee in a tutorial dialogue, and the
advice-taker in an advisory dialogue.
Case 4: S thinks that H is mistaken
Suppose that p 62 B(S) and p 2 B
+
(H). Then S
doesn't believe p even though he's aware that H
does. This implies that S thinks H is mistaken in
the belief that p.
The fact that p 62 B(S) and p 2 B
+
(H) could
entail that a text that's reliable for S isn't for H .
For example, suppose that H believes, by some
weird perception of social convention, that there is
a defeasible causal preference that greetings cause
standing ups. Suppose that S wants to describe
the situation where Max stood up and then John
greeted him (i.e. an exception to H 's causal pref-
erence). Then this is like the exception case above
concerning falling and pushing: (15) is reliable for
S but not for H .
(15) Max stood up. John greeted him.
Again, S could compensate for this by explicitly
marking the temporal relation. Alternatively, the
fact that p 62 B(S) and p 2 B
+
(H) could entail
that a text that's unreliable for S is reliable for
H . Again, let p be the causal law that says that
greetings cause standing ups. But this time sup-
pose that S wants to describe the situation where
John's greeting Max caused him to stand up. So
this time, S wants to describe an instance of the
causal law. Then both (15) and (16) are reliable
for H , but only the latter is reliable for S.
(16) John greeted Max. He stood up.
Since (15) is unreliable for S, it would not be in
the set of possible linguistic realisations, if this set
is characterised by what S nds reliable, as we've
assumed so far. So perhaps this set should be con-
strained by considering B
+
(H) from the start.
Conclusions
Here, we summarise the current shape of the
model, and briey discuss one of its potential
shortcomings.
We admitted that that job of defeasible reason-
ing in generation could be very general; but that
we were going to look at it in the context of the In-
teractive Defaults strategy. We assumed that some
process took messages, and produced ordered ut-
terances, in accordance with (for example) topic-
comment strategies. id then applies to the candi-
date utterances (or the space of utterances), and
criticises the utterances (or the space), producing
better utterances, or a smaller space. The grounds
for criticism we discussed were the temporal ram-
ications of the utterance; if it was incoherent for
H , unreliable for H or dangerously ambiguous (for
S), it was a bad utterance.
Discourse structure and temporal structure are
here somewhat detached. The discourse structure
was used in determining the original sequencing;
but now it's only the causal-temporal structure
derivable from the candidate that is being criti-
cized. It may therefore be thought that the dis-
course structure is an idle wheel as things stand,
and should be either eliminated (cf. Sibun [1991]),
or be trusted with a greater share of the work,
enriching the discourse with useful clue words [cf.
Scott and Souza [1990]). Our tentative view is that
the latter view is perhaps correct, and anyway is
closer to the idea of generation by defeasible rea-
soning, canvassed early on. It's true that simplest
is sometimes best. But it does seem like a lot of
hard work to generate simple candidates which al-
most always require debugging, when we could in-
stead do all the work in advance, by default.
References
Asher, N. and Morreau, M. [1991] Common Sense Entail-
ment: A Modal Theory of Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In
Proceedings of the 12th International Joint Conference on
Articial Intelligence, Sydney, Australia, August 1991.
Bach, E. [1986] The algebra of events. Linguistics and Phi-
losophy, 9, 5{16.
Grice, H. P. [1975] Logic and Conversation. In Cole, P. and
Morgan, J. L. (eds.) Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3:
Speech Acts, pp41{58. New York: Academic Press.
Hinrichs, E. [1986] Temporal Anaphora in Discourses of
English. Linguistics and Philosophy, 9, 63{82.
Hobbs, J. R. [1985] On the Coherence and Structure of Dis-
course. Research report No. csli{85{37, Centre for the
Study of Language and Information, Stanford, Ca., Oc-
tober, 1985.
Hobbs, J., Stickel, M., Martin, P. and Edwards, D. [1988]
Interpretation as Abduction. In Proceedings of the 26th
Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics, State University of New York at Bualo, Buf-
falo, N.Y., 7{10 June, 1988, pp95{103.
Hobbs, J., Stickel, M., Appelt, D. and Martin, P. [1990]
Interpretation as Abduction. Technical Note No. 499,
sri International, Menlo Park, Ca., December 1990.
Hovy, E. [1990] Pragmatics and Natural Language Genera-
tion. Articial Intelligence, 43, 153{197.
Joshi, A., Webber, B. and Weischedel, R. [1984]
Default reasoning in interaction. In Proceedings of the
Non-Monotonic Reasoning Workshop, aaai, New York,
October, 1984, pp144{150.
Joshi, A., Webber, B. and Weischedel, R. [1986] Some As-
pects of Default Reasoning in Interactive Discourse.
Technical Report MS-CIS-86-27, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
Konolige, K. [1991] Abduction vs Closure in Causal Theo-
ries. Forthcoming Research Note in Articial Intelligence.
Page references to ms.
Lascarides, A. and Asher, N. [1991] Discourse Relations
and Common Sense Entailment. dyana deliverable 2.5b,
available from Centre for Cognitive Science, University of
Edinburgh. Submitted to Journal of Logic, Language and
Information.
Lascarides, A. and Oberlander, J. [1991] Temporal Coher-
ence and Defeasible Knowledge. Submitted to Theoretical
Linguistics.
Scott, D. R. and Souza, C. S. [1990] Getting the Message
Across in rst-based Text Generation. In R. Dale, C.
Mellish and M. Zock (eds.) Current Research in Natural
Language Generation. London: Academic Press. Sibun
1991
Sibun, P. [1991] Generating Text without Trees. Unpub-
lished ms.
